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Relational contracts, collaboration and outsourcing in the 
supply chain 
 
Abstract 
Relational contracts are key to supply chain collaboration. The literature has focused on the role of 
trust stemming from prior interactions with current suppliers – that is, the shadow of the past. 
However, the role of future interactions – the shadow of the future –, and the role of collaborating 
internally as an alternative to collaborating with current suppliers, has been relatively neglected. 
This paper contributes to the literature by examining how the shadow of the future affects the 
choice to outsource, that is, the choice to collaborate with external suppliers rather than with 
internal units. Using regression analysis of fine-grained and extensive data on construction projects 
and carefully controlling for endogeneity, our results show that the shadow of the future promotes 
outsourcing and that this impact is larger when the shadow of the past is stronger and there is more 
specificity in the relationship. Our results are consistent with a game theoretic logic in which 
informally promising future interactions to sustain collaboration is more credible to external 
suppliers than to internal units because the former can use their assets elsewhere. Also, our results 
suggest that trust stemming from prior interactions is complementary to the calculativeness logic 
that stems from the shadow of the future. 
Keywords: Outsourcing (Make or Buy), Buyer/Supplier Relationships, Partnering (Alliances), 
Contracting. 
 
1. Introduction 
Supply chains involve many actors, which typically have different objectives. Consequently, it is 
very important to align all the players’ actions for the success of the supply chain. The vast research 
on supply chain collaboration is a testament to this fact (e.g., Leuschner, Rogers and Charvet, 2013; 
Flynn, Huo, and Zhao, 2010; Stank, Kelly and Daugherty, 2001; Adams et al, 2014; Fawcett et al., 
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2012). This body of research has shed light on many topics, such as the broad spectrum of 
outsourcing arrangements and their risks (Sanders et al., 2007; Feeney, Lacity and Wilcox 2005), 
the integration of supply chains (Leuschner et al, 2013), and the structure and boundary of the 
supply chain (Carter, Rogers and Choi, 2015). Fundamental insights from this literature include that 
formal contracts are insufficient to attain alignment and that supply chain managers need to think in 
terms of “relational contracts” (Vihnas, Heide and Jap, 2012; Sanders at al., 2007). 
Although some progress has been made, we contend that the existing research on relational 
contracts in supply chain management suffers from two limitations. First, supply chain scholars 
have focused on how current relationships in the supply chain have been built from previous 
interactions – a process we call the shadow of the past. Thus, they neglect the importance of 
expectations about future interactions – which we call the shadow of the future. These two shadows 
suggest different logics of collaboration, and thus, the literature should identify and study both. In 
short, whereas past interactions breed goodwill and trust, which lead to cooperative behavior 
(Gulati and Nickerson, 2008, Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010, Wathne and Heide, 2000, Poppo at al, 
2008b), expectations of future interactions involve a tradeoff between collaborating today to 
increase the likelihood of obtaining future rewards and behaving opportunistically at the expense of 
future rewards (Baket et al, 2002; Gil and Marion, 2013). While the shadow of the past taps into the 
psychological and sociological motivations that sustain collaboration, the shadow of the future taps 
into self-interest maximizing behavior. As relational contracts encompass the analysis of the 
shadows of the future and the past, which often produce complex patterns, we contend that studying 
how these two shadows differ and interact is very important to fully understanding supply chain 
collaboration. 
Second, the literature has focused on the study of collaboration of a focal firm with external 
actors (e.g., suppliers), largely sidestepping the study of its alternative, namely, collaborating with 
internal actors (e.g., employees, divisions, and departments) (a notable exception is Handfield, 
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Cousins, Lawson, and Petersen, 2015). Schematically, the literature examines how a buyer and 
supplier relationship has evolved, identifies which factors have enhanced it and considers how this 
relationship favors performance. However, supply chains involve actors within and between firms; 
thus, the study of collaboration should include both types of actors. The key insight here is that, 
depending on the circumstances, eliciting collaboration from internal actors might be harder or 
easier than eliciting collaboration from external actors. This variation creates a need to link 
relational contracts to the outsourcing decision, that is, to the choice to collaborate externally versus 
internally. This connection has been made theoretically by Baker et al (2002) and Klein (1996), but 
it has been largely neglected by empirical studies both within and outside the supply chain 
community (two notable exceptions are Gulati and Nickerson, 2008 and Gil and Hartman, 2011). 
Consequently, we claim that we should examine how relational contracts affect outsourcing as 
carefully as the literature has studied the impact of relational contracts on current suppliers 
assuming that the decision to use suppliers is unaffected by relational contracts.  
In this article, we attempt to bridge these two gaps by empirically analyzing how the shadow of 
the future affects the make-or-buy decision in supply transactions. In addition, we explore how this 
impact is moderated by two factors: the shadow of the past and specificity. We build from game 
theoretic ideas to predict that a larger expectation of future interactions leads to a larger increase of 
collaboration incentives for the external supplier in comparison to the increase of collaboration 
incentives for the internal supplying units. The logic behind this prediction is that when actors are 
trading off “opportunism today” versus “the promise of future rewards”, granting asset ownership to 
the supplying party (i.e., outsourcing) increases the credibility of the promise of future rewards. 
Credibility increases because if the buyer denies its promise to the external supplier the latter can 
use its assets in alternative buyers, an option that is not easily available to the employee. Credibility 
is important because often these promises are not enforceable by third parties. Simply put, the 
buyer´s downside risk of not keeping its word is higher if she does not control the asset, and thus 
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promising future benefits to promote collaboration is more credible for a supplier than for an 
employee.  
Further, we propose that our prediction regarding the positive impact of the shadow of the 
future on the use of outsourcing will hold with more force under two conditions. First, we propose 
that the shadow of the past will increase the impact of the shadow of the future on the use of 
outsourcing. On top of creating trust between actors, prior interactions provide a signal of expected 
future interactions. Both trust and signaling will increase the credibility of promising future volume. 
This is consistent with recent evidence that has shown that these two shadows are complementary in 
trust formation (Poppo et al., 2008a) and biding behavior (Gil and Marion, 2013).  
The second condition that increases the impact of the shadow of the future on the use of 
outsourcing is the extent of specificity. When specificity is higher (i.e., the value for both parties in 
the relationship is higher than the value of their second-best option), the impact of the expectation 
of future interactions on the incentives to outsource is stronger because higher costs of shifting 
suppliers increases the credibility of a promise to grant future rewards to the external supplier. If 
there is no specificity in the relationship, then the buyer can shift to a different supplier without 
penalty, which in turn, would eliminate the credibility of promising future rewards to the external 
supplier. In other words, credibility is enhanced when the buyer risks losing value from defection 
(Williamson, 1983). This interaction may also be rationalized from a different angle: higher 
incentives for collaboration are most useful when the risk of opportunism is higher, that is, when 
specificity is present in the transaction.  
We test our predictions in the Chilean construction industry using extensive, fine-grained 
project data that covers over 40% of the square meters executed in Chile from 2004 to 2012. We 
analyze contractor decisions to internally execute or to outsource to subcontractors in each of the 
specialty trade activities (e.g., molding, painting) that are needed to complete a construction project. 
A key feature of our analysis is the use of building permits granted at the regional level as a 
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measure of the shadow of the future. This measure has two desirable properties: i) building permits 
involve sunk costs and are public, so they provide a fairly credible signal of the expected level of 
contractor activity in the region, and ii) because each contractor minimally affects the total number 
of building permits (i.e., the industry is atomized), its effect is exogenous to each contractor, 
allowing for a causal estimation of the impact of the shadow of the future.  
Additionally, the names of each contractor and subcontractor for each specialty tra0de and each 
project are available in our dataset; thus, we can measure prior interactions in detail. Finally, we use 
a measure of specificity that is critical for project setting, namely, temporal specificity. This type of 
specificity arises when timely delivery is essential (Masten et al, 1991). We measure temporal 
specificity by identifying the specialty trade activities that occur at the beginning of a project and 
whose timely delivery is more important than later activities because delays cascade throughout the 
project. 
Our results support our predictions. First, we find that the expectation of future interactions 
favors the outsourcing of the specialty trade activities. Second, we find that this impact is more 
pronounced when the contractor has more prior interactions with its subcontractors and when 
temporal specificity is higher. In addition, we show that prior interactions increase the prevalence of 
outsourcing and that, as with the shadow of the future, the impact is stronger when temporal 
specificity is higher.  
       This article is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, the second section develops 
the hypotheses, and the third section presents a short overview of the construction industry. The 
fourth section introduces the database and econometric methods, and the fifth section presents the 
results. Finally, the sixth section presents a discussion of the results and the main conclusions.  
2. Hypotheses Development  
The make-or-buy decision was first considered by Coase (1937), who argued that managers should 
weigh the benefits of internal production against the costs of outsourcing to make a decision about 
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these options. Borrowing from Coase’s arguments, Williamson (1975) developed the transaction 
costs economics (TCE) approach. Under TCE assumptions, relationship-specific assets increase the 
likelihood of opportunistic ex post renegotiation, which is best managed using a hierarchical 
governance structure (i.e., “make”) instead of the market (i.e., “buy”). Thus, as specificity increases, 
the use of market exchange diminishes, which favors internal performance of the activity 
(Williamson, 1991). The empirical evidence supports this theory (see Macher and Richman, 2008 
for a review). 
In this context, two main areas of research have evolved in the study of supply chains. First, 
outsourcing has become an important topic in supply chain management (e.g., Feeney, Lacity and 
Wilcox 2005) as a decision with strategic implications (Sanders et al., 2007). Supply chains involve 
networks of players wherein a manufacturer must constantly consider the interface between the firm 
and the supply stage of its value chain (Carter et al., 2015). A second stream of research, which 
perhaps captures a larger share of the attention, is associated with the study of collaboration in 
supply chains. Although internal production has been considered the main mechanism to resolve 
holdup problems in make-or-buy decisions, there are plenty of examples in which collaboration 
arises in supply chains even in the absence of clearly delineated property rights or adequate formal 
contractual safeguards (Araujo et al., 2008). These collaborations can arise from relational 
contracts, which can originate, for instance, from a history of interactions between parties (i.e., from 
the shadow of the past) or from the gains to be derived from expected future interactions (i.e., from 
the shadow of the future). Under this view, relational capital originating in relational contracts is 
important in explaining the success and stability of interorganizational exchanges (Poppo et al., 
2008b). Although both shadows are important in relational contracts, the literature has tended to 
focus on the shadow of the past. Further, the focus on relational contracts with current suppliers 
while keeping fixed the outsourcing choice, may have led to a relative neglect of collaboration 
within the firm as a viable alternative to increase collaboration in the supply chain. As Baker et al 
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(2002) indicates: “the integration [insourcing] decision can be an instrument in the service of the 
parties’ relationship” (p. 41) (beyond and above the avoidance of hold-up problems). 
In the rest of this section, we discuss how the shadow of the future might impact the make-or-
buy choice and how this impact is moderated by two conditions: the shadow of the past and the 
extent of specificity.  
2.1. The shadow of the future and the make-or-buy decision 
The influence of the shadow of the future on collaboration hinges on the idea of self-enforcing 
informal agreements (Klein, 1996). To be self-enforcing, both parties to the relationship must have 
an incentive to satisfy the agreement without the participation of a third party. This incentive exists 
when the expected value of deviating from the pre-agreed upon action is lower than the expected 
value of continuing the relationship. Research has indicated that the incentives to satisfy an 
agreement are greater when continuous business between the parties is expected (i.e., the shadow of 
the future) (e.g., Poppo et al. 2008a; Welling and Kamman, 2001). 
 A cornerstone of the literature on relational contracts (e.g., Klein and Murphy, 1988; Klein, 
1996; Halac, 2012) is that informal agreements center on the capacity of parties to enforce these 
agreements through the expectation of gains to be derived from future interactions (Gil and Marion, 
2013). The expectation of continuity embedded in a relational contract may provide the incentives 
to make the specific investments that are necessary to increase the productivity of the buyer-
supplier relationship because the possibility of obtaining the required return to justify those 
investments increases with the expected duration and depth of the relationship. The expectation of 
continuity also promotes cooperation between parties in many value-sharing activities that are 
difficult to define and specify contractually, such as those related to tacit knowledge and alliance 
formation (Dyer and Singh, 1998). In general, this game theoretical logic posits that the longer the 
expected time horizon of a relationship, the higher the benefits of cooperation (Friedman, 1971) and 
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that an expectation of ongoing interactions is necessary to promote collaboration and trust (Telser, 
1980, Axelrod, 1984).  
 However, the incentives to cooperate within an ongoing relationship increase for both an 
employee (i.e., make) and for an external subcontractor (i.e., buy). Thus, a relevant question is 
whether internal or external suppliers will be more incentivized to cooperate by the expectation of 
increased future business. Baker et al. (2002) show that the increase in expected cooperation 
stemming from a future relationship is higher for external suppliers because their ownership of 
assets, which can be devoted to alternative uses, grants them more bargaining power over the 
principal in comparison to the buying power exerted by the employees of the same principal. This 
bargaining power, which increases with the opportunity cost of the asset, allows the external agent 
to bargain for a compensation from the principal to continue the relationship. Thus, the buyer’s 
temptation to renegotiate a contract is smaller under outsourcing than under internal production, 
increasing the incentives to engage in and the likelihood of pursuing outsourcing. 
 In our setting, a buyer’s larger stream of expected future business increases the likelihood of 
business continuity. However, the buyer will more credibly promise continuity in the relationship to 
an external supplier than to an internal employee because the former has more bargaining power 
stemming from its ability to counteract a broken contractor’s promise. This discussion leads to 
hypothesis 1 (H1): 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A focal firm with higher expected future business faces reduced incentives to 
perform the activity internally. 
 
2.2. The moderating impact of the shadow of the past 
 Research has shown that relational capital can originate not only from the expectation of future 
interactions but also from a history of interactions between parties (i.e., from the shadow of the 
past) (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). This relational capital arises because repeated exchanges 
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between a buyer and a supplier form embedded social relationships (Granovetter, 1985) from 
individual-level attachments that facilitate friendship and respect (Kale et al., 2000) or from the 
promotion of trustworthiness between partners (Vanneste et al., 2014). Prior interactions also 
facilitate the development of firm capacities to assess its counterpart’s capabilities, to avoid the 
selection of partners who have shown a tendency to engage in opportunistic behavior, to identify ex 
ante empty threats and non-credible promises that may affect the relative merits of alternative 
governance choices (Gulati, 1995), to support the development of mutual knowledge that decreases 
the parties’ coordination costs (Gil and Marion, 2013), to promote adaptations to unexpected 
requests and to generate commitments to mutual problem solving that support the adaptation 
required to sustain an effective supply chain (Elfenbein and Zenger, 2014; Kwon and Suh, 2004; 
Poppo et al. 2008a).  
 If the partner firm fulfills positive expectations through prior interactions, the focal firm will 
develop greater confidence in the partnership, mitigating future concerns about opportunism 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997). Recent meta-analysis evidence from Vanneste et al (2014) indicates that 
there is a positive relationship between the length of prior interactions and trust. If the partner firm 
does not fulfill positive expectations through its interactions, the focal firm will not develop 
confidence in the partner, exacerbating concerns about future opportunism and affecting the 
continuation of the relationship. Thus, more interactions among firms in a supply chain imply closer 
relationships to ensure efficient performance (e.g., Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010) and the ability to 
eliminate from consideration suppliers that fail to meet minimum standards (Wathne and Heide, 
2000).  
 Although the relational capital generated by prior interactions may reduce the threat of 
opportunism even if there is no future volume, the expectation of future interactions promotes 
cooperation and trust. The discussion of the effects of the shadows of the past and the future, and 
the debate surrounding them, is long-standing in the literature. For example, Williamson (1993) has 
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termed the former “personal trust” and the latter “calculativeness trust”. Zaheer and Harris (2005) 
have indicated, “for sociologists trust is only about the past, whereas for economists it is only about 
the future” (p. 181), while Vanneste and Frank (2014) have argued that the shadow of the past and 
the shadow of the future can both lead to cooperation.  
 An important question arising from the previous discussion is how the shadows of the past and 
future interact to affect organizational decisions. Relying on questionnaires completed by key 
respondents in several firms, Poppo et al. (2008a) show that the impact of each of these shadows on 
one another and on trust formation is increasing, suggesting that the past and the future are 
intertwined in the origins of interorganizational trust. In a different setting, Gil and Marion (2013) 
have analyzed California’s highway construction sector, finding that contractor bids are lower when 
prior interactions with subcontractors are accompanied by an expectation of future interactions. 
Vanneste et al. (2014) have acknowledged that trust based on prior interaction is more valuable and 
enduring when the trusted party gains more from the relationship in the form of future interactions.  
 Unlike the existing body of literature, our aim is to analyze how the shadow of the past 
moderates the effect of the shadow of the future in the firm’s make-or-buy decision. We assert that 
a promise of future volume that sustains collaboration is more credible when there are more prior 
interactions with the same partner. This relationship history increases the amount of trust in and the 
productivity of a buyer-supplier match. Productivity is higher because previous interactions with the 
same supplier promote mutual learning, knowledge, adaptability, and coordination, all of which 
increase the incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. Higher productivity incentivizes an 
increase in the continuation value of a given buyer-supplier relationship. 
 In sum, the shadow of the past is expected to reinforce both the value of a given buyer-supplier 
relationship and the incentives to outsource that stem from additional expected interactions. This 
discussion leads to hypothesis 2 (H2): 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The negative relationship between a focal firm’s expected future business and 
its incentives to perform an activity internally is stronger when the number of prior interactions 
with suppliers is higher. 
 
 
2.3. The moderating impact of specificity 
 In this section, we analyze whether specificity moderates the effect of the shadow of the future 
on the make-or-buy decision. The standard TCE prediction is that the existence of specificity 
increases the incentives to perform specialty trade activities internally mainly because of the fears 
and costs of opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1979 and 1985). However, whether relational 
governance mitigates losses when opportunities for self-interested behavior exist is highly debated 
(Poppo et al., 2008b).  
 We argue that when specificity is higher (i.e., when the value obtained by both parties is higher 
within the relationship than outside it), the impact of expected future business on the incentives to 
outsource is higher. This stronger impact can be rationalized from two different, albeit related, 
angles. First, in a buyer-supplier relationship characterized by specificity, the buyer’s costs of 
shifting suppliers are higher. Thus, the credibility of a promise to grant future rewards to that 
supplier increases. If there are no specific assets in the buyer-supplier relationship, the buyer may 
shift to a different supplier without penalty, which in turn, reduces the credibility of promised future 
rewards to the supplier stemming from the shadow of the future. Thus, the credibility of future 
volume as a promise that sustains collaboration with an external supplier is enhanced when the 
buyer bears higher costs from defecting from her promise (Williamson, 1983).      
Second, the moderating effect of specificity on the relationship between the shadow of the 
future and outsourcing may also be rationalized from the perspective that the external supplier’s 
incentives for collaboration are higher when the risk of opportunism is higher. If a buyer that faces 
specificity in its exchanges with suppliers can credibly promise to reward them with future work if 
they do not behave opportunistically, then suppliers will have more to lose from holding up the 
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buyer, which reduces expected shirking. This complementary rationale is consistent with ideas from 
TCE (Williamson, 1991). Additionally, the expectation of continuity provides parties with 
incentives to make the specific investments necessary to improve the productivity of the buyer-
supplier relationship. 
 The type of specificity that we analyze is temporal specificity (Masten et al., 1991). In many 
cases, particularly in project-based industries (Winch, 2001; Chang and Ive 2007a; 2007b), the 
performance of the supply chain as a whole is highly dependent on the timely completion of its 
constituent activities. Thus, coordination among activities is important, particularly with respect to 
sequential handoffs and/or overlapping activities (Tommelein et al., 1999). Knowing the importance 
of timely delivery, external suppliers may behave opportunistically in order to extract quasi-rents 
from the buyer (Masten et al., 1991). For example, the supplier might indicate that more time and 
work has to done, but requiring a higher price than previously agreed. We speculate that temporal 
specificity is an important, but seldom studied condition in many supply chains. We believe that 
incorporating it to the study of supply chain collaboration is novel and fruitful. 
 In sum, the effects of expected future interactions on the make-or-buy decision are modified by 
the transactional setting. A transactional setting in which opportunism looms large will benefit more 
from creating future expected interactions. More generally, a key insight of our framework is that 
the impact of relational contracts on the make-or-buy choice is increasing in the level of specificity, 
i.e., relational contracts are more valuable when the risk of opportunistic behavior is greater. The 
incentives for cooperation under a stronger shadow of the future, for both the buyer and the external 
supplier, are higher when there are relationship-specific collaborations. Based on this discussion, 
we obtain hypothesis 3 (H3): 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The negative relationship between the focal firm’s expected future volume of 
business and its incentives to perform the activity internally is stronger when the temporal 
specificity of the activity is greater. 
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3. Empirical Setting 
 We analyze the study hypotheses in the context of the construction industry. This industry is 
important (accounting for 8-10% of GDP in many countries; see Gordon, 1992) and represents an 
ideal setting for research on governance because construction projects are long-lasting, non-
standardized, and require both cooperation and contractual relationships among specialized project 
constituents. These characteristics produce complex relations between contractors and 
subcontractors (Puddicombe, 2009; Winch, 2001). Recent research has started to address this 
industry in areas such as vertical integration and outsourcing (Brahm and Tarziján, 2014; Gonzalez-
Diaz et al., 2000), repeated interaction (Gil and Marion, 2013), hybrid contracting (Ebers and 
Oelermans, 2013), alliances (Lui and Ngo, 2004) and contract choice (Corts, 2012; Bajari et al., 
2008).  
 The value chain in the construction industry functions as follows. A contractor, who may be in 
charge of many different projects simultaneously, builds a project for an owner-developer according 
to the specifications provided by the designer, who is typically (though not always) appointed by 
the owner. During the construction period, the contractor must decode and interpret the designer’s 
documents to produce a quality product for the owner-developer. Various specialty trade activities 
(e.g., metallic structure, formwork, electrical work, plumbing) must be executed, and the building 
contractor must decide whether to make or buy each activity. This choice is the unit of analysis of 
this paper. In this setting, “making” implies executing the activity internally, whereas “buying” 
implies outsourcing the activity to subcontractors (also known as specialty trade contractors). These 
subcontractors are typically specialized, that is, there is little diversification of activities (Ng and 
Tang, 2010). The contractor’s primary function with respect to the specialty trades is to coordinate 
the subcontractors and internal teams to ensure timely and successful project delivery (Tommelein 
and Ballard, 1997).  
Several characteristics of construction projects are very interesting for the study of supply 
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chains. To highlight these characteristics, we use the ontology of supply chains proposed by Carter 
et al (2015). First, as indicated in the previous paragraph, a construction project is a point of 
convergence in a vast network of contractors, subcontractors, professional services firms, and 
suppliers, all collaborating to deliver the final building. A network view of construction projects is 
important to understanding the project supply chain (Dubois and Gadde, 2000). Consequently, the 
tension between control and self-organization to adapt to frequent changes in projects is an 
important challenge. Second, because the inputs and materials that are used in construction projects 
are highly specialized, specific supply chains, which are largely independent, are formed for each 
input. This creates high variance in supply chains coalescing at a single point. Third, all of these 
supply chains are relative to the focal agent, which in the case of construction projects, is the main 
contractor. The same contractor coordinates and manages these separate supply chains. Thus, we 
have a desirable situation of high variance in the supply chains of a single focal actor.  
Another interesting feature of construction projects supply chains is activities need to be 
performed in sequence. In this setting, if an activity is not properly conducted, all subsequent 
activities, and the project as a whole, will suffer. This is especially true for activities that have to be 
performed earlier, in which case the costs of poor performance can be quite high. In these activities, 
contractors might behave opportunistically in order to extract quasi rents from the buyer. This type 
of specificity, and ensuing transactional hazards, is very important in construction (Winch, 2001). 
In the variables measurement section, we develop temporal specificity in detail.  
      The construction industry tends to be specific to the regional context. First, the high 
transportation costs and geographical specificity of projects incentivize the generation of 
“construction districts,” clusters of firms operating within a particular region (Buzzelli and Harris, 
2006). Second, the industry relies heavily on local regulations, institutions, government offices and 
quality inspectors (e.g., for building permit issuance), which vary between and within countries 
(Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Winch 2001). Contractors and subcontractors also tend to 
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specialize in the types of projects they execute (e.g., residential buildings, office buildings, 
industrial buildings, educational facilities, commercial buildings) (Ball, 2003). Some of these 
projects are more standardized (e.g., large housing complexes), whereas others exhibit high degrees 
of heterogeneity and differentiation (e.g., health facilities, industrial buildings).   
4. Methods 
4.1. Data 
 We used a unique database provided by ONDAC S.A., a firm that collects detailed data on 
construction projects and sells it to construction suppliers and building material manufacturers. The 
database covers the period from January 2004 to October 2012 and includes 46,420,398 square 
meters built over 12,272 projects. The database includes approximately 40% of the total square 
meters constructed in Chile during that period.  
 For each project, detailed information about the building contractor is available (e.g., 
executives, website, address, and company name). Most importantly, we have information about the 
nine main specialty trade activities executed: 1) building and installing the metallic structure; 2) 
building the formwork; 3) installing electrical service; 4) installing plumbing and water service; 5) 
installing the heating and cooling system; 6) building and installing the windows; 7) painting; 8) 
building and installing the furnishings and appliances; and 9) installing gas service. These activities 
account for a large proportion of the total number of activities in a typical construction project 
(Riley et al., 2005). The data indicate whether the contractor performed each activity internally or 
relied on an external subcontractor. In the case of the latter, detailed information about the 
subcontractor is also available (e.g., executives, website, address, and company name). We also 
have detailed information about each project, such as square meters (m2), geographic location (city, 
state), project dates, and comments about each project’s overall characteristics. Finally, each project 
is classified as one of the following types: housing complex, office building, residential building, 
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health facility, educational facility, hotel, industry, commercial project (e.g., banks and 
supermarkets), religious building, or single-family house. 
4.2. Variable measurement  
 Vertical integration. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if 
the specialty trade activity was performed internally by the building contractor and zero otherwise. 
For each project, we include nine dummy variables, one for each specialty activity. 
 Future volume in the region (Shadow of the future). To compute the shadow of the future, we 
used the natural logarithm of the total number of approved building permits in year t+1 in the region 
in which the focal project is being executed. We obtained building permit statistics from the 
Institute of Statistics, which releases a yearly statistical review of building permits by geographical 
region. We consider building permits at the regional level because subcontractors and contractors 
tend to have local operations.  
 To obtain a building permit, the contractor must comply with many requirements, such as 
detailed drawings, structural calculations, project costs, and technical specifications. These 
requirements entail joint work among project participants (e.g., designers and suppliers) well in 
advance of the permit request, which creates visibility for the suppliers. Additionally, before 
requesting a building permit, the contractor must file for approval of the draft of the project. This 
information becomes publicly available once this requirement is met. Thus, industry players have 
access to reliable information about the planned volume of contractor operations in each region.  
 Our measure of future volume is consistent with Gil and Marion (2013), who used the volume 
of regional permits issued in the year following an auction to proxy for the “shadow of the future” 
for highway construction projects. Similarly to Gil and Marion’s measure, our proxy for the shadow 
of the future has the advantage of being exogenous to the individual contractor, which favors the 
identification of causality. Because the contractor might decide to increase its future volume as a 
consequence of the boundary choices made earlier (e.g., the contractor may outsource to redirect 
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scarce managerial attention to growth opportunities), it is important to use a measure of the shadow 
of the future that is independent of the contractor and not subject to reverse causality problems. The 
number of building permits at the regional level meets this exogeneity requirement because the 
construction industry is not highly concentrated, and thus, the total number of building permits 
issued at the regional level cannot be accounted for by any individual contractor1. In our data, the 
mean market share at the regional level is 4.4%, but the distribution of contractors is highly skewed 
toward zero: the median is 2.1%, the 75th percentile is 6.4%, the 90th percentile is 13%, and the 99th 
percentile is only 27.6%.  
 As a robustness check, we disaggregated building permits by industry sector at the regional 
level, e.g., we used future building permits in the housing sector to analyze a project in that sector. 
Our results remained unchanged. Although contractors tend to specialize in industry sectors, 
subcontractors do not; thus, we prefer the aggregate measure. 
Stock of prior interactions (Shadow of the past). Gulati (1995) and Corts and Singh (2004) have 
used the number of interactions between each pair of firms before the transaction under analysis. 
We constructed a similar variable. First, we created the adjacency matrices in which the rows show 
the contractors and the columns show the subcontractors. These matrices, which display the 
frequency of transactions between each possible contractor-subcontractor pair, were computed for 
each specialty trade activity and region. To obtain the stock of prior interactions, we computed 
these matrices, restricting our observations to the four years before the start of a project2. For 
                                                     
1 Alternatively, we can use a contractor-level measure of future volume, such as the volume built in year t+1. 
However, this requires us to pursue one of two alternatives that may alter the spirit of the paper: 1) adjust the 
theory to allow for endogeneity by including bi-directional and alternative mechanisms (e.g., the likelihood of 
performing the activity internally and building in-house capacity increases when you can use that capacity 
repeatedly over time; or 2) adjust the empirics to eliminate these alternative mechanisms. In non-reported 
results (available upon request), we checked that the second alternative was feasible and obtained findings 
analogous to our main predictions. However, this alternative complicates the analysis by requiring us to 
address the additional mechanisms. In the end, our story is about expected interactions and causality, which 
are better captured by exogenous regional volume. 
2 As we compute this variable using the previous four years, i.e., from t-4 to t-1, and our dependent variable is 
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example, if a project started in 2011, we computed the adjacency matrices for the period from 2007 
to 20103. Because we compute this variable using the previous four years and our dependent 
variable is specified at year t, we lose the first four years of data. Next, we computed the average 
number of projects that a contractor has executed with each subcontractor in each specialty trade 
activity in each region. For example, if the contractor completed 10 projects over the previous 4 
years in a particular region and he subcontracted a particular specialty trade in 6 of them, 4 to 
subcontractor A and 2 to contractor B, then our measure of prior interactions for that specialty trade 
and region is 3. If the contractor had no prior projects or if it always integrated a particular specialty 
trade activity, we set this variable to zero because these situations entail no interaction with 
subcontractors.  
 Our measure of prior interactions captures each contractor’s overall propensity to repeat 
subcontractors in its projects. Because contractors and subcontractors are highly specialized 
geographically, this measure also largely captures repeated interactions occurring at the local level4. 
Similarly to our measure of the shadow of the future, prior interactions might be affected by 
endogeneity, in this case mainly by omitted variable bias. To address this issue we include, in 
addition to a large set of fixed effects (FE), two control variables tailored to prior interactions: 
                                                                                                                                                                 
specified at year t, we lose the first four years of data. In addition, given that firms do not enter the database at 
the same time, some variance in prior interactions may be related to entry timing rather than different 
strategies regarding prior interactions. However, the inclusion of contractor fixed effects controls for this 
confounding effect. Additionally, we perform robustness checks in which we restrict contractors to have 
different number of projects in the previous 4 years. The results did not change. 
3 The length of the period used to measure prior interactions depends on the length of the time of the actual 
transaction. For example, Corts and Singh (2004) have analyzed the drilling of exploratory wells, which takes 
between 30 and 60 days, and prior interactions are considered over the previous 6 months; Elfenbein and 
Zenger (2014) have studied the supply auctions of a large manufacturing company and use the previous 4 
quarters to measure the stock of prior relationships. Given that the projects analyzed in this article last 1.5 
years, on average, and that an activity takes between 20% and 30% of the total project time, on average, we 
believe that 4 years is an appropriate time window for our setting. 
4 As a robustness check, we measure prior repeated interactions between two specific parties taking into 
account the relationship that a contractor has in its prior interactions with each of its subcontractors. That is, 
when the focal activity in a project in year t was executed by subcontractor “s”, we used the number of prior 
interactions with that particular subcontractor “s”. To obtain this measure, we displayed adjacency matrices 
and counted the number of times that the contractor interacted with each subcontractor over the past four 
years in that activity. Our results are robust to this alternative measure. 
    19 
 
“Average contractor vertical integration over the previous 4 years” and “Number of contractor 
projects over the previous 4 years”. These variables are described in the appendix5.  
 Activity executed at the start of the project. A particularly important requirement in construction 
projects is the “timely coordination” of the “trade parade” of specialty trade activities (Tommelein 
et al., 1999; Eccles, 1981). Accordingly, scholars have suggested the term temporal specificity for 
this and other project-based industries (Masten et al., 1991). Temporal specificity refers to the 
existence of critical paths (i.e., activities that are prerequisites for other tasks), which may lead to 
heavy losses if the project sequence breaks down (Tommelein et al., 1999; Bashford et al., 2003). 
These expenses may include not only financial opportunity costs but also operational costs (Ng and 
Tang, 2010) due to disruptions to hard-to-balance capacity plans across projects (O’Brien and 
Fisher, 2010). Knowing the criticality of schedule, subcontractors might behave opportunistically, 
typically by claiming that more work and time is needed and requesting a higher price than 
originally agreed upon (Chang and Ive, 2007a and 2007b). Requiring extra work at higher prices is 
more frequent when change orders are more likely, particular if the change orders have ambiguous 
apportionment responsibilities6, and when the costs of disrupting the project are higher.  
 
                                                     
5 The “stock of prior interactions” variable may suffer from endogeneity because a higher level of vertical 
integration decreases the likelihood of interacting with subcontractors. We address this problem in two ways. 
First, and to detach the measure of prior interactions from the make-or-buy choice in year t, we computed 
prior interactions over the four years before the project, i.e., from t-4 to t-1. Second, we include the 
contractor’s degree of vertical integration during the same period as our measurement of prior interactions as 
a control variable, that is, from t-4 to t-1. This avoids bias from not accounting for the fact that prior vertical 
integration affects both current integration and previous prior interactions. In addition, we added the number 
of projects over the previous four years as a second control variable. The rationale for the latter control 
variable is that a contractor with fewer projects, conditional on its degree of prior integration, will face a 
lower likelihood of interacting repeatedly with subcontractors.  
6 Change orders are requests made by a party in the project to do some rework, to change a particular aspect 
of the project, or to add new work. It is more often that these change orders come from the owner, the 
contractor or the designer. These change orders typically undermine the contractual terms devised by the 
contractor, such as liquidated damages clauses or payment retentions and guarantees, that attempt to 
discourage supplier opportunism (Chang and Ive, 2007b; Uher, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2005). 
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 The subcontractors involved at the beginning of a project typically face greater uncertainty and 
thus more change orders (Winch, 2001). These subcontractors also have more bargaining power 
because a delay during an early stage cascades to subsequent activities, creating higher disruption 
costs (Bashford et al., 2003). Thus, to capture the higher propensity of these subcontractors to 
exploit temporal specificity, we used a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the specialty 
trade activity is “building and installing the metallic structure” or “building the formwork” (the two 
activities executed in the first stages of the project) and 0 for activities that are performed in later 
stages of the project. 
 Control variables. We included a large set of control variables as well as year, contractor, 
activity, region and type of project FE in our models. In the appendix, we detail these variables and 
their measurement. 
 Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics and displays the correlation matrix for the 
variables considered in this study. 
[Insert Table I around here] 
4.3. Econometric model  
 To empirically analyze the contractors’ integration decisions, we pooled the specialty trade 
choices and performed a cross-sectional analysis including FE for year, region, type of project, 
specialty trade activity and contractor. Accordingly, we used the following econometric model to 
study the vertical integration decision of building contractor i for activity j and project n:  
 
Vertical integrationi, j, n = 0 + 1 * Future volume i, n + Controls + FE +  i, j, n                                                                                                                      
(1) 
 
Equation (1) was used to evaluate hypotheses 1, which predicts that 1 < 0. To study hypotheses 2 
and 3, we consider the following econometric model: 
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Vertical integrationi, j, n = 0 + 1 * Future volume i, n + 2 * Stock of prior interactionsi, j, n + 3 * 
Future volume i, n * Stock of prior interactionsi, j, n + 4 * Activity at the start i, j, n + 5 * Future 
volume i, n * Activity at the start i, j, n + 5 * Stock of prior interactionsi, j, n * Activity at the start i, j, n + 
Controls + FE +  i, j, n    (2) 
   
 According to hypotheses 2 and 3, we would expect that 3 and 5 < 0. We included an 
interaction term between “Activity at the start” and “Stock of prior interactions” to avoid the 
confounding effect of the interaction between past interactions and specificity. 
 We used OLS to estimate (1) and (2). Because the dependent variables of the models are 
dichotomous, the OLS model becomes a linear probability model (LPM). Although logit or probit 
models would also be appropriate, the interpretation of logit and probit results is troublesome, 
particularly for interaction terms. A LPM simplifies the interpretation of our coefficients of interest. 
Our results are robust to the use of both LPM and logit/probit models7. To further reduce omitted 
variable bias, we included several control variables (see the appendix) and a wide array of FE (e.g., 
contractor, type of project, activity, year, and region). 
5. Results  
 The results are presented in table II. The overall fit of models to data is good, with r-squares of 
approximately 40%. Overall, the signs and significance of the coefficients do not change when we 
                                                     
7 In logit models, the marginal effects of each variable are different for each observation (Hoetker, 2007; 
Wieserma and Bowen, 2009) and allow for a fitted curve of predicted probabilities that is nonlinear and 
bounded between 0 and 1, two features that are violated by LPMs. Further, interaction terms, in addition to 
varying across observations, can change their signs, requiring complex graphical techniques to analyze the 
coefficients (Wieserma and Bowen, 2009). Given that we are interested in the overall effect of the variables 
rather than predictions for specific construction firms, a LPM is sufficiently accurate and easy to interpret (see 
Wooldridge, 2009: 587). This is particularly true for large sample analyses because the central limit theorem 
relaxes the need to model non-normal errors (Wooldridge, 2009). We conducted robustness checks of all of 
our models; the results did not change (available upon request). Thus, for simplicity, we maintain the OLS 
specification. 
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estimate logit models. Model 5 (logit) is comparable to model 2 (OLS), indicating that the LPM 
provides reliable estimates.  
 We will focus on model 2 to evaluate our first hypothesis. Model 1, as explained below, is used 
to elucidate a multicollinearity issue that arises in the evaluation of H1. From a naïve analysis of 
model 2, it may be concluded that future volume is not related to outsourcing. However, the null 
statistical significance of the future volume variable is paired with a large effect: a one standard 
deviation change in future volume is related to a decrease of 4.8 percentage points in vertical 
integration (see figure 1). This disconnect is produced by the presence of multicollinearity, which 
inflates the standard errors of the coefficient of future volume in model 2. This multicollinearity is 
explained by the high correlation between the “future volume in the region” and the set of region 
dummies8. Multicollinearity occurs because the volume of each region, although it varies over the 
sample period, differs considerably by region. Multicollinearity can be confirmed by examining 
model 1, which excludes the regional dummies. In this model, the future volume in the region is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Given that multicollinearity only reduces the 
statistical significance of the “future volume” coefficient, inferences and conclusions can be drawn 
from model 2. Our results support H1: future interactions diminish the incentives to produce an 
activity internally (i.e., they increase the use of outsourcing). Our results also show that the impact 
of future interactions on the “make-or-buy” decision is larger than the individual impact of prior 
interactions.  
 As the baseline expectation suggested, model 2 shows that prior interactions are significantly 
(at the 99% confidence level) and negatively related to vertical integration. A one standard 
deviation change in prior interactions diminishes vertical integration by 2.1 percentage points (i.e., 
from 50% to 47.9%).  
                                                     
8 The VIF of future volume is 71. The VIF of the dummy of the metropolitan region (the largest region) is 
around 131. (Both of these factors are well above the maximum recommended value of 10). This translates 
into a decrease in the t-test of 88% (=1-1:71^0.5) and 91% (=1-131^0.5), respectively. 
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  [Insert Table II, Figure 1 around here] 
5.1. Interaction with the shadow of past   
 In model 3, we include an interaction term between future volume and prior interactions. The 
coefficient of this interaction is negative, though the coefficient is individually not significant. 
However, the joint test of significance for the individual terms plus their interaction is highly 
significant (at the 99% confidence level). This result is not uncommon for interaction terms because 
they are prone to multicollinearity, producing low individual significance but high joint 
significance9. Moreover, the economic significance of the interaction term for the impact of future 
volume is relatively strong: when prior interactions are low (i.e., the mean minus one standard 
deviation), the impact of one standard deviation increase in future volume promotes a decrease of 
3.8 percentage points in vertical integration. Conversely, if prior interactions are high (i.e., the mean 
plus one standard deviation), a one standard deviation increase in future volume produces a 
decrease of 5.6 percentage points in vertical integration. This result is graphically depicted in figure 
2. This multicollinearity can also be interpreted as evidence of a deep interrelationship between the 
shadow of the future and the shadow of the past in explaining vertical integration. The results of 
model 3 support H2 and its underlying rationale: the credibility of future volume as a promise that 
sustains collaboration is higher when suppliers are trusted, leading to higher levels of outsourcing. 
 [Insert Figure 2 around here] 
5.2. Interaction with temporal specificity 
 In model 4, we estimate equation (2). First, the results show that the interaction term between 
future volume and the dummy for activities that occur at the beginning of a project is significant (at 
the 95% confidence level) and negatively related to the internal performance of the activity. An 
increase of one standard deviation in future volume diminishes the internal performance of the 
                                                     
9 The VIF of the interaction term is 230, which translates into a 93% decrease in the value of the t-test. 
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activity by 6.3 percentage points. However, this latter value decreases to only 4.1 percentage points 
when the activity occurs at later stages. This result is graphically displayed in figure 3; it supports 
both H3 and its rationale. The credibility of future volume as a promise that sustains collaboration is 
higher when the buyer bears higher costs if the promise is not kept. A complementary interpretation 
of this result is that relational contracts are more valuable when the risk of opportunistic behavior is 
larger.  
The results also show a negative and significant (at the 90% significance level) interaction term 
between prior interactions and the dummy of activities that occur at the beginning of a project (the 
joint test for the variable of prior interactions and its interaction term is significant at the 99% 
level). This interaction term is an important control variable: it allows us to interpret the interaction 
between temporal specificity and future volume as a result of increasing credibility of the promise 
without confounding it with the trust and goodwill that is mainly captured by the shadow of the 
past. Interestingly, the significant result for the interaction between specificity and the shadow of 
the past can also be interpreted as the impact that trust and goodwill have on containing 
opportunism without being affected by the signaling content of continuing interactions into the 
future (which is captured by the future volume). Figure 4 provides an interesting summary of these 
two dynamics. Trust and goodwill stemming from prior interactions decrease opportunistic behavior 
(or increase collaboration), thus reducing the impact of specificity on the make-or-buy decision. In 
addition, specificity increases the credibility of future rewards informally promised to suppliers, 
which increases outsourcing.     
[Insert Figure 4 around here] 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this article, we explored how relational contracts affect collaboration incentives and the 
make-or-buy decision. We studied these topics using a large database of construction projects, 
where the main contractor faces make-or-buy decisions in nine specialty trades. Our results can be 
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summarized as follows. First, we show that increases in expected future interactions with the focal 
contractor increase collaboration incentives for external suppliers, increasing the likelihood of 
outsourcing. In short, collaboration through the market rather than through the firm is enhanced as 
the shadow of the future lengthens. The rationale for this result is that under conditions of some 
specificity in the relationship between a buyer and a supplier, granting asset ownership at the supply 
stage (i.e., outsourcing) increases the credibility of a promise of future volume, mainly because the 
external supplier has the freedom to channel its assets toward alternative customers if the buyer 
reneges on its promises of future volume. Second, we found the impact of the shadow of the future 
on outsourcing is stronger when the shadow of the past is larger and when specificity is higher. The 
main rationale for this second set of findings is that promises are more credible when the supplier is 
known and trusted and when the buyer has more to lose from broken promises. 
 We contribute to the literature on supply chain collaboration on several fronts. First, we show 
that it is important to consider the role of the shadow of the future – i.e., the expectation of future 
interactions – as a basis for relational contracts. This important driver of collaboration has been 
relatively neglected in favor of the shadow of the past – i.e., the history of prior interactions. We 
show that the more calculative logic of the shadow of the future explains the choice to collaborate 
with external suppliers (rather than with internal units) as much as the trust and goodwill logic of 
the shadow of the past. Although only two prior papers have studied related questions, they yield 
results that are consistent with ours. Gulati and Nickerson (2008) have shown that the trust 
stemming from prior interactions diminishes vertical integration; however, they use questionnaires 
for only two firms, and more importantly, they do not explore future interactions. Using a large 
sample administrative data, Gil and Hartman (2011) show that stronger social networks lead to 
lower vertical integration, studying neither prior nor future interactions.  
 Second, we show that the shadows of the future and the past are complementary in creating 
collaboration incentives. This result suggests that the trust produced by previous interactions is 
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complementary to the self-interested calculus triggered by continuing the relationship into the 
future. Although this result is consistent with prior research (Gil and Marion, 2012; Poppo et al 
2008), these two logics may be substitutes, namely, goodwill and trust may be crowded out by self-
interest (Vanneste and Frank; 2014). We believe that further research on how these two logics 
interact to form and sustain relational contracts would be fruitful. We can readily pinpoint two 
avenues of inquiry: i) additional testing of the substitution versus complementarity of the 
“sociological” and “calculative” logics, and ii) additional study of the conditions under which each 
shadow is more important for collaboration, independent of their interaction. Extant research by 
Schilke and Cook (2015) provides a way forward on the latter issue by presenting conditions that 
determine when and where a ‘calculative logic’ in relationships exerts a higher impact than a 
‘goodwill logic’ on predicting trustworthiness between exchanging parties.   
 Third, we go beyond studying solely how relational contracts affect collaboration with suppliers 
to study how relational contracts affect the make-or-buy choice, namely, the choice between 
collaborating within the firm and using the market. The literature so far has emphasized how 
relational contracts affect collaboration with suppliers without realizing that the choice to use 
suppliers in the first place is also affected by relational contracts. As Baker et al (2002) mention, 
“integration [insourcing] can be an instrument in the service of the parties’ relationship” (p. 41). We 
show that informal promises of future volume are both more credible and conducive to 
collaborative effort from an external party than from an internal one, particularly if the external 
party is trusted and the stakes are high.  
 Fourth, we show that capital goods projects, such as construction, can be a great source of 
analysis for supply chain scholars. As discussed in the empirical setting section, in a construction 
project, typically many supply chains coalesce at the same unit, the project. We explored the make-
or-buy decision for nine different specialty trades. Because the different products and services that 
are used to complete a capital goods project are very different and require highly specialized inputs 
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and suppliers, the supply chains for these different products are almost entirely independent from 
one another. This characteristic provides considerable variance of choices and realities to study. In 
addition to this rich variance, these different supply chains share a focal actor, which in our case, is 
the contractor. This high variance relative to one actor is valuable for empirical studies. As Carter et 
al (2015) remind us, supply chains are always relative to a specific actor.  
Finally, we also highlight the importance of temporal specificity in capital goods projects, a 
condition that might be encountered in many others supply chains. When activities are sequential 
and timing is important, collaboration is much more important in the first activities of the supply 
chain. We found that the negative effects of specificity on outsourcing decrease as both prior and 
future expected interactions increase. We think that this finding is also relevant because it suggests 
that managers can worry less about outsourcing activities with higher levels of specificity when 
they have built relationships with external parties in their supply chain or when they are able to 
credibly signal expectations of future business and future interactions to suppliers. To sum up, we 
contend that capital goods projects provide an excellent setting in which to study supply chain 
phenomena.  
 We can elaborate some important managerial implications from our work. First, when the 
collaborative behavior of suppliers is incentivized by promises of future interactions, managers 
should take great care to ensure the credibility of those promises. This can be conducted in several 
ways. Our results point to the fruitfulness of making promises to trusted contractors that are costly 
if broken. Second, the results indicate that signaling future work is especially valuable when the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior stemming from transactional hazards is greater. Third, 
managers should not forget that outsourcing is a tool that can be used to increase collaboration 
incentives. This is especially relevant when informal promises are important to collaboration.  
     Our study has some limitations. First, we analyze a specific economic sector, the construction 
industry. Although the empirics might generalize to other project-based sectors, a more 
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comprehensive study across economic sectors should be undertaken to confirm our findings. For 
instance, construction projects show important variance in size and duration, which might not be the 
case in all project-based industries. Second, local regulations are important in the construction 
industry, and thus, our conclusions should be taken with care when applied to different settings. 
Third, additional research should focus on intermediate organizational forms. Whereas our focus is 
on pure forms (i.e., the make-or-buy decision), many organizational arrangements are not pure 
(Stinchcombe, 1985). Therefore, we should view governance forms as distributed on a continuum 
beyond the make-or-buy dichotomy. Fourth, there are location-specific factors, other than 
regulations, that can influence the behaviors of contractors and subcontractors.  
 In conclusion, we believe that our main contribution is the development of a more nuanced 
theory of collaboration in the supply chain (see Carter et al., 2015). The distinction between trust 
stemming from past interactions and self-interested calculations stemming from expected future 
interactions as well as the comparative analysis of collaboration within and between firms are two 
subtle factors that can enhance our understanding of supply chain collaborations.  
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Table I. Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Integration of specialty trade activity 1.000                
2 
Stock of prior interactions with subcontractors in the 
previous 4 years 
-0.283 1.000               
3 Future volume in region -0.046 0.054 1.000              
4 Activity executed at the start of the project 0.211 -0.020 0.027 1.000             
5 Thinness of the subcontractor market 0.216 -0.078 -0.026 0.530 1.000            
6 Project distance -0.022 0.066 -0.382 -0.008 0.035 1.000           
7 Contractor capability on the specialty trade activity 0.112 -0.002 -0.022 -0.123 -0.086 -0.145 1.000          
8 Project size -0.165 0.139 -0.121 -0.011 0.018 0.109 0.127 1.000         
9 Contractor size -0.213 0.265 -0.100 -0.016 0.010 0.201 0.211 0.593 1.000        
10 Simultaneous number of projects of the contractor -0.106 0.163 -0.077 -0.027 -0.002 0.196 0.172 0.132 0.613 1.000       
11 Contractor market share -0.028 0.077 -0.403 -0.038 0.094 0.200 0.227 0.295 0.500 0.340 1.000      
12 Contractor diversification -0.214 0.136 0.025 0.009 -0.017 0.121 0.013 0.210 0.470 0.366 0.148 1.000     
13 Contractor geographical dispersion -0.127 0.120 -0.220 -0.023 -0.005 0.427 -0.016 0.212 0.544 0.560 0.363 0.370 1.000    
14 
Contractor average vertical integration in the previous 4 
years 0.516 -0.583 -0.141 0.199 0.183 -0.072 0.172 -0.223 -0.392 -0.200 -0.028 -0.353 -0.219 1.000   
15 Contractor number of projects in the previous 4 years -0.171 0.314 0.010 -0.016 0.039 0.232 0.206 0.256 0.617 0.692 0.312 0.436 0.492 -0.348 1.000  
16 Demand uncertainty in the prior decade -0.042 -0.056 0.016 0.001 -0.130 -0.052 -0.049 -0.015 0.055 0.060 -0.144 -0.024 -0.009 0.009 -0.130 1.000 
                    
  N 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 
  Mean 0.485 1.718 14.785 0.286 0.217 0.532 0.402 8.226 9.855 5.754 0.044 0.246 0.225 0.511 16.266 46.536 
  Std. Dev. 0.500 1.732 0.958 0.452 0.265 1.203 0.342 1.757 1.806 5.506 0.057 0.253 0.263 0.336 13.960 29.638 
  Min 0.000 0.000 12.365 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.237 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.830 
  Max 1.000 21.000 15.747 1.000 1.000 8.000 1.000 11.971 12.921 29.000 0.462 0.791 0.751 1.000 70.000 86.060 
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Table II. Regression models (†)(‡) 
 Dependent Variable: Integration of the Specialty Trade Activity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main variables:                                               Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS LOGIT 
Future volume in region -0.033*** -0.050 π -0.045 π § -0.036 π § -0.391 
 (0.008) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.267) 
Stock of prior interactions with subcontractors  -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.029 § 0.033 § -0.085*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.039) (0.039) (0.031) 
Activity executed at the start of the project  0.341*** 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.683*** 2.766*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.016) (0.191) 
Future volume in region X Stock of prior interactions   -0.003 § -0.003 π §  
   (0.002) (0.003)  
Future volume in region X  
    Activity executed at the start of the project    -0.023**  
    (0.011)  
Stock of prior interactions X  
    Activity executed at the start of the project    -0.010* §  
    (0.005)  
Control variables:      
Project Distance 0.012** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.036) 
Thinness of the subcontractor market 0.067*** 0.058** 0.057** 0.090*** 0.457** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.191) 
Contractor capability on the specialty trade activity  0.088*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.539*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.110) 
Project size -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.129*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) 
Contractor size 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.037 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.051) 
Simultaneous number of projects of the contractor -0.004** -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.017 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Contractor market share -0.377* -0.438** -0.439*** -0.441*** -2.909*** 
 (0.150) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (1.039) 
Contractor diversification -0.031 -0.034 -0.034  -0.035 -0.224 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.216) 
Contractor geographical dispersion 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.020 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.244) 
Contractor average vertical integration in the previous 
4 years 0.455*** 0.457*** 0.454*** 0.457*** 2.374*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.173) 
Contractor number of projects in the previous 4 years -0.003* -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.016* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) 
Demand uncertainty in the prior decade 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.003) 
Constant 0.975*** 1.243** 1.170** 1.033** 5.690 
 (0.135) (0.532) (0.539) (0.544) (3.805) 
Type of Project, Year, and Specialty Trade Activity 
Fixed Effect? YES YES YES YES YES 
Region Fixed Effects? NO YES YES YES YES 
Contractor Fixed Effect? YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Number of Observations 9198 9198 9198 9198 9198 
R-Square [pseudo] 39.82% 40.07% 40.07% 40.13% [33.79%] 
(‡) Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses (†) p < 0.1 *; p < 0.05 **; p < 0.01 *** (§) p value < 0.01 in a joint t-test (π) The 
variable of region future volume is highly collinear with the region fixed effects generating a large variance inflation factor.   
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Figure 1. The impact of the “Future volume in the region” on the likelihood of vertical integration.  
 
Figure 2. The moderating role of the “stock of prior interactions” on the impact of future volume in 
the region on vertical integration. [Construction of this graph: Using the estimates from model 4, we compute the 
derivative of vertical integration on “future volume”, and setting “activity at start of the project” at its mean, we allow for 
“Prior interaction” to move one standard deviation around its mean. Then, we multiply the result by one standard 
deviation in future volume] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The moderating effect of the schedule of the activity on the impact of “Future volume on 
the region” on the likelihood of vertical integration. [Construction of this graph: Using the estimates of model 
40%
42%
44%
46%
48%
50%
52%
54%
mean future
volume - 1sd
mean future
volume
mean future
volume  + 1sd
Vertical 
Integration
-6.0%
-5.0%
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
Mean prior
interactions - 1sd
Mean prior
interactions
Mean prior
interactions + 1sd
Impact of a one 
standard 
deviation 
increase in 
Future Volume 
on Vertical 
Integration
41 
 
    41 
 
4, we compute the derivative of vertical integration on “future volume”, and setting “prior interaction” at its mean, we 
allow for “activity at start of the project” to be 0 or 1. Then, we multiply the result by one standard deviation in future 
volume] 
 
 
Figure 4. The impact of the location of the activities at the start of the project on the likelihood of 
vertical integration diminishes with increases in prior and expected interactions. [Construction of this 
graph: Using estimates of model 4, we compute the derivative of vertical integration on “activity at start of the project” 
and then varied the extent of prior interaction and future volume. Low is the mean minus one standard deviation; High is 
the mean plus one standard deviation] 
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APPENDIX: Control Variables Measurement   
Thinness of the subcontractor market. Because subcontractors specialize geographically (Ball, 
2003; Somerville, 1999), we measured the thinness of the subcontractor market using a measure of 
market concentration of the subcontractors in each specialty trade activity and geographical region, 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). A high HHI indicates that a few subcontractors dominate 
the subcontractor market, increasing their bargaining power relative to contractors. The HHI was 
computed for a two-year window to avoid spurious changes; for example, the HHI associated with 
the year 2012 was computed using data for the 2011-2012 period. 
Project distance. Project distance should affect vertical integration: A distant project is harder for a 
contractor to monitor, and local subcontractors may see an unknown foreign contractor as less 
trustworthy. Project distance was measured by computing the distance between the project’s region 
and the region that contains the highest percentage of total square meters built by the contractor in 
the year of the project. We tested other measures, such as the distance between the project’s 
location and the region containing the contractor headquarters, and our results remained unchanged.  
Contractor capabilities. To capture the influence of capabilities on firm boundaries (Argyres, 1996; 
Argyres et al, 2012), we measured the differential in capabilities between the contractor and the 
subcontractors with respect to the different specialty trade activities (Jacobides and Hitt, 2005). We 
computed the number of accumulated square meters built by the contractors and subcontractors in 
each subcontracting activity for the previous four years of the project (from t-4 to t-1). Using this 
information, we computed the percentile in which the contractor would be placed in the ranking of 
the subcontractors for each of the nine specialty trade activities considered in this study. A higher 
ranking is associated with greater capabilities. To capture the geographic specializations of the 
contractors and subcontractors, we computed this ranking for each of the 11 regions in our dataset.  
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Project size. Large projects tend to be more complex and to affect the vertical integration choice 
(Bajari et al, 2008). Accordingly, we include the natural logarithm of the project size, in square 
meters, as a control variable. 
Contractor size. A widely used control variable in the strategic management literature is company 
size (Boyd, Gove and Hitt, 2005). We controlled for size by using natural logarithm of the square 
meters built by each contractor for each year of the sample. 
Contractor number of simultaneous projects. Addressing a large number of projects simultaneously 
is complex, which might affect the governance choices of contractors by increasing the costs of 
internal production. Given that projects last for at least a year, on average, we computed the total 
number of projects that a particular contractor executed in each year of the sample. 
Contractor market share. A contractor with market power stemming from a high market share 
might possess the ability to influence (or discipline) the behavior of subcontractors to counteract the 
impact of transactional hazards, reducing the likelihood of vertical integration (Shervani, Frazier 
and Challagalla, 2007). For the construction industry, several authors have noted that market power 
may exist at the geographical level (Ball, 2003; Gil and Marion, 2013). Accordingly, contractor 
market share was measured at the region level by the contractor’s share of the total square meters 
built in each region for each year of the sample. 
Contractor diversification. Diversification might affect the degree of vertical integration (Rawley 
and Simcoe, 2010). We measured the degree of diversification by calculating the HHI (Nayyar, 
1992), which we computed as the sum of the squares of the share of each project type in the total 
square meters built by the contractor for each year of the sample. 
Geographical dispersion. The geographical dispersion of the contractor affects its monitoring 
ability and thus, its vertical scope. Geographical dispersion is computed as the HHI index, using the 
square meters built by each contractor in each year in the different regions of the country. 
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Contractor average vertical integration in previous four years. The number of repeated interactions 
tends to be smaller in the case of a contractor that integrates more of its projects because it has 
fewer opportunities to repeat subcontractors. Thus, we included the integration of the contractor 
over the same period as the repeated interaction variable, that is, over 4 years. As governance 
choices tend to persist (Argyres and Zenger, 2013) and prior choices affect subsequent ones, this 
variable is very likely to bias the results if it is omitted from the model. In essence, by including this 
variable, we are acknowledging that repeated interaction measures two choices: The first is whether 
to vertically integrate or use the market. The second, contingent on choosing outsourcing, is the  
frequency of the use of subcontractors.  
Contractor number of projects in previous four years. Similarly to prior vertical integration, the 
number of projects that the contractor executed in the previous four years will be related to prior 
interactions: more projects will give the contractor more opportunities to interact repeatedly with its 
subcontractors. If this variable is also related to vertical integration, then the results might be biased. 
Thus, we included the total number of projects of the contractor in the previous four years as a 
control variable.  
Uncertainty. Uncertainty may affect vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). Based on Leiblein and 
Miller (2003), we measure uncertainty as the squared sum of the errors for a linear regression of the 
monthly building permits for each project type and each region for ten years before the year we are 
analyzing (e.g., for 2008, we used data from 1999 to 2008). We collected the building permit 
information from reports released by the Chilean Institute of Statistics. Because seasonality may 
systematically affect the squared sum of the errors, the data series were seasonally adjusted using 
the Arima X-12 procedure. 
 
